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1. INTRODUCTION
Swaziland's Fourth National Development Plan advocates the
development of outgrower schemes based on the example of Vuvulane
Irrigated Farms as an alternative strategy for rural development
(Swaziland government 1985:309). If this recommendation were to be
adopted as agricultural policy, it would necessitate land reform in the
areas where these schemes are to be established. This is because of the
existing division in land ownership between Swazi Nation Land and
freehold Title Deed Land. Swazi Nation Land is held by the King "in
trust" for "the nation" and allocated through chiefs to Swazi subjects.
Private property in land in Swaziland dates to the concessionary era
when large scale concessions were made to European land speculators and
prospective farmers in the late nineteenth century by King Mbandzeni.
Contrary to what has been argued in much of the literature on
Swaziland, this land division has not entailed the development of
dualism in agriculture, with the "modern" agricultural sector based on
freehold title deed land and the "traditional" sector on Swazi Nation
Land (SNL). Rather, both the land division and dualism are products of
the development of capitalist relations which have generated an uneven
and differential development characterised by the evolution of
large-scale multinational and South African dominated enterprises on
freehold land, and the development of petty commodity production on SNL.
One question arising out of the advocation of the development of
outgrower schemes and various forms of contract farming in Swaziland
relating to land tenure, is whether or not such schemes can be
established on SNL. To put it more specifically: is private ownership
in land a pre-requisite for the establishment of viable contract farming
schemes? This study will show that while freehold land leased out to
petty commodity producers is undoubtedly advantageous for the owners of
capital, in terms of the extra control which can be exerted over petty
commodity producers, this is by no means a pre-requisite for the
development of outgrower schemes.
While it will be demonstrated that land tenure is not
indicative of the form of production which takes place in agriculture,
the chief concern of this paper is to examine the extent to which
outgrower schemes in Swaziland have succeeded in their stated objectives
of bringing "commercial farming" to the peasantry. The key question
which emerges is whether or not outgrower schemes facilitate peasant
accumulation and create the conditions for the reproduction of a rich
and/or middle peasantry. Answers to these questions will be sought
through an examination of three outgrower schemes. Two of these,
(Vuvulane Irrigated Farms and Mpetsheni Pineapple Settlement Scheme) are
on freehold Title Deed Land, while one (Casalee Tobacco Project) is on
both freehold and SNL where petty commodity producing participants are
based. The paper argues that contract farming and outgrower schemes are
best understood in the context of the social relations to which this
form of capitalist development in agriculture gives rise. Such schemes
have differentiating effects and create the conditions for the
reproduction of a middle peasantry, as well as the potential for more
systematic accumulation by peasant producers. In Swaziland land tenure
both on SNL and freehold title deed land, through restricting the size
of land holdings of scheme participants, may have constraining effects
on the extent to which accumulation becomes possible for petty commodity
producers on such schemes.
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2. CONTRACT FARMING AND OUTGROWER SCHEMES
There is a growing body of thought amongst development planners
throughout the Third World that outgrower schemes and contract farming
arrangements involving peasant producers can provide alternatives for
rural development to state directed "modernisation/improvement" type
rural development programmes, such as Swaziland's Rural Development Area
Programme (RDAP).
Writers such as Glover (1985) and Goldsmith (1985) have
attempted to demonstrate the technical efficiency of outgrower schemes
and the positive role they can play in overall agricultural development.
These arguments, however, have tended to ignore the analysis of the
relationship between petty commodity producers and the multinational
companies which engage in contracts with them. They also proceed from
the neo-classical populist assumption (Scott, 1977; Bernstein 1985)
that under perfect market conditions, rational peasant producers will
make utilitarian choices and decisions and will become viable
agricultural producers through membership of contract farming and/or
outgrower schemes. Furthermore, this approach does not examine the
historical processes involved in the development of this form of
capitalist production and ignores the structure of social relations
which contract farming creates.
Those writing from a dependency position, like Dinham and Hines
(1983), examine this relationship and find it exploitative. But they
tend to overlook the fact that contract farming has benefitted certain
smallholders, generated rural differentiation and, in cases, enabled
local capital accumulation to take place in a variety of ways.
Buch-Hansen and Marcussen (1982) presented evidence which contradicts
the dependency position by demonstrating how outgrower schemes in
Western Kenya have led to significant levels of capital accumulation,
benefitting sections of the peasantry and leading to social
differentiation. Another related position is that of Currie and Ray
(1986) and Cowen (1981) whose work, based on research findings in Kenya,
argues that although contract farming may be differentiating, it tends
to produce the conditions for middle peasant reproduction alone.
Contract farming and outgrower schemes entail a relationship
between smallholder agricultural producers and agribusiness which in
cases is in partnership with the local state (Neocosmos and Testerink,
1985). Agribusiness tends to control the most profitable sector - the
marketing of agricultural commodities. It also restricts the peasantry
to a production process which it indirectly controls while generally
managing the scheme and providing technical services and other means of
production, as well as providing credit to peasant producers on
favourable terms. It is not, therefore, merely the presence of a
contract which is significant, but over and above this the monopoly
power which agribusiness exerts over the market and which structures the
relationship between smallholders and agribusiness (ibid), is a central
feature of this form of agricultural development.
Outgrower schemes transfer the major investment burden and risk
to the producers who may be the prime sufferers when world market prices
fluctuate. Also, outgrower schemes free agribusiness from labour
management, while petty commodity producers are under pressure to
increase the length of the working day over and above that which is
possible under plantation conditions. In this way, the role of
agribusiness resembles that of a landlord in some parts of the world
(ibid.)
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In Swaziland, outgrower schemes and farming contracts are
entered into on both SNL and freehold Title Deed Land. The schemes on
SNL are both dryland farming operations and farms under irrigation,
especially in the Northern RDA where rice production takes place. The
rice is grown with the assistance of Taiwanese inputs and extension
services, and sold on contract at a fixed price to the Tibiyo Rice
Project. Tomatoes grown on irrigation schemes in the north have been
sold to a South African cannery through contract arrangements in the
past.
In the southern regions South African companies, particularly
the Pongola-based Transvaal Cotton Ginnery, offer inputs and extension
services to dryland cotton growers in return for a guaranteed price.
Hence some cotton producers market in South Africa instead of through
the Cotona Cotton Ginnery in Big Bend. Indeed it would appear that a
wide variety of contract farming arrangements exist on SNL in the south
of the country - one petty commodity producer interviewed sells cayenne
pepper on contract to a South African Duban-based firm.
In Shiselweni a tobacco project recently established by Casalee
Pty Ltd has encouraged an outgrower scheme. Casalee has leased a number
of private farms but is primarily concerned with encouraging peasants on
SNL to produce their dark fired cultivar, guaranteeing prices which are
more favourable for petty commodity producers than the traditional air
cured variety which has been grown by peasants and title deed farmers in
the Shiselweni region for about fifty years.
The government has encouraged tobacco cultivation and in 1975
it launched an intensive production campaign to stimulate tobacco output
on SNL. According to Dlamini (1985) tobacco producers on SNL have been
offered bonuses and other material incentives, but the overall trend has
been a decrease in air cured tobacco cultivation. This is reflected in
Ministry of Agriculture data which shows a decline from 200 tons
produced in 1975/76, to 83 tons in 1982/83. Dlamini offers three major
reasons for this decline: the development of Taiwanese assisted maize
schemes which offer an attractive alternative to tobacco production;
the disaffection of tobacco producers on SNL with the Swaziland Tobacco
Co-operative in Nhlangano; and the arrival of Casalee with its own
cultivar.
The Swaziland Tobacco Co-operative is controlled by freehold
title deed farmers and membership favours those who produce substantial
quantities of tobacco each year. This is because the co-operative makes
two payments to tobacco growers: the first includes recovery of money
spent on farm inputs as well as profit, while the second is aimed at
encouraging maximum production of the crop and favours well-to-do
farmers who have sold a good crop in that crop season. This payment is
known as an "agterskot", or an extra bonus offer after initial payment
(Dlamini, 1985:27). Therefore, the prevailing situation in many ways
was favourable for Casalee, who have been able to draw on the experience
as well as the discontent of SNL tobacco producers.
2.1 Casalee Tobacco Project
The Casalee Tobacco Project was formally established in 1983.
Casalee Pty Ltd, a Belgian-based company owned and managed by
ex-Rhodesians, conducted a number of surveys throughout southern Africa
in the early 1980s in order to establish favourable locations for
tobacco growing projects. The scheme is already well established in
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Malawi, Zaire, Zimbabwe and in the South African Venda bantustan.
Casalee's surveyors found ideal conditions in southern Swaziland and, as
a result, they decided to go ahead and establish a project in the
kingdom.
Essentially, Casalee is a tobacco marketing company and its
main aim therefore was to find petty commodity producers for its dark
fired or smoke cured variety of tobacco. The initial reaction from
petty commodity producers who were experienced in tobacco cultivation
was cautious, and Casalee decided to pilot its Swaziland operation
through leasing land from private owners. Accordingly they went in
search of derelict farms and eventually secured 120 ha of land for
cultivation on three separate farms situated fairly close together near
Nhlangano. Two of the farms belong to the Swazi Nation through Tibiyo
and Tisuka respectively. The 20 ha Tisuka farm was leased on a basis
similar to the 50 ha main farm, but the Tibiyo farm only came under
Casalee management for the first three years while a Tibiyo counterpart
manager was being trained.
Owing to the initial caution of petty commodity producers,
Casalee was able to find only six households willing to join the scheme
during its first year of operation (1983/84). According to Dlamini
(1985:28), the company "spread the rumour that the cultivar which the
farmers had been growing would no longer be accepted at the
co-operative", and that the recommended "Groot Swazi" cultivar had been
changed to the "Dark Fire" cultivar. The Tobacco Co-operative failed to
clarify the issue and a number of peasants abandoned their crops.
Nevertheless, Casalee's superior handling and marketing capacity was
demonstrated through the experience of the six petty commodity producers
who farmed with Casalee during the 1983/84 season. Consequently, the
number of interested peasant tobacco growers began steadily to increase.
In 1984/85 the number of participants rose to 25; by 1985/86 the number
had grown even further to 150; and in 1986/87 there were an estimated
410 growers. Of these, 225 were in the Mahamba/Nhlangano area, 110 in
Mahlangatsha and 75 in Magubheleni and Ngwempisi. A number of the
experienced growers continue to cultivate the traditional "Groot Swazi"
variety alongside Casalee's cultivar, because they feel a greater sense
of membership in the local co-operative where they are issued with
membership cards which reflect production and sales for particular
seasons.
Petty commodity producers who wish to participate with Casalee
do not have to enter the scheme via their respective chiefs. Casalee
have hired a manager specifically for the purposes of recruiting peasant
producers into the scheme. This is done through RDA project managers
who facilitate meetings between Casalee management and potential tobacco
producers. At these meetings Casalee is able to explain the terms under
which it operates.
• The company offers tractor hire services at £20 an hour for
ploughing and provides this service, along with certain other inputs, on
credit. Fertiliser may be supplied on credit at 10% interest, but the
sawdust required for the smoke curing process is provided free of
charge. Seeds are also supplied free, but seedlings are available for
late starters at thirty cents per hundred. Casalee planted about thirty
ha of seedlings during the 1986/87 season.
Peasants who are interested in joining the scheme are visited
by Casalee management to check on their land and drying facilities.
They must have sheds or huts specially for the curing process which
ultimately determines the quality of their final product. Management
also checks the soil before admitting an applicant to the scheme.
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Thus far, according to management, there has been no opposition
by chiefs to the scheme, and the chief of Magubheleni is actually a
grower himself. This is probably largely due to the fact that growers
operate on already allocated land, and do not require extra land in
order to join the scheme. The average size of each grower's plot is
estimated at 1/8 ha, but there are a number of cases where large parcels
of land are used. One producer near Mahamba has seven drying sheds and
aimed to cultivate up to 2 ha during the 1986/87 season, while a number
around Nhlangano planted 1 ha and more.
Casalee is not particular about who joins the scheme from a
homestead and more than one member may join using separate parcels of
land if they wish. Management estimates that 75-80 % of their growers
are women, and only about 2% of male growers are young men. Scheme
participants decide for themselves which parcel of their land they wish
to use, and once they have planted their crop Casalee tries to monitor
their plots. Management and Casaleeps three field officers try to visit
each participant producer at least once a month in order to keep track
of their progress. Many of the participants have considerable
experience in growing air cured tobacco and although some still grow
both varieties, as noted, unanimity was expressed over the higher
returns which Casalee's dark fired variety brings. Speaking to growers
clearly revealed that Casalee offers a source of cash for petty
commodity producers who may otherwise have limited ready cash resources.
Casalee prefers dealing with petty commodity producers to
plantation operations because they believe that intensive cultivation on
small plots produces a better quality crop to that grown on a large
scale. Peasants produce intensively, using their own sources of labour.
In this way the Casalee project reinforces what we noted earlier about
typical contract farming relations between agribusiness and the
peasantry. Agribusiness is able to take advantage of the
"self-exploitation" of petty commodity producers and their combination
of the functions of capital and wage labour, within their own households
(or within a single individual), through their own sources of labour
(Gibbon and Neocosmos, 1985: 177). Thus, through outgrower schemes
agribusiness is able to avoid not only the problems of labour management
associated with plantation enterprises. It is - equally significantly -
able to rely on the extraction of relative surplus value, and also to
take advantage of absolute surplus value extraction. This takes place
in petty commodity producing enterprises through the increase in the
length of the working day and the free exploitation of women and
children.
Ideally, Casalee management would prefer it if all scheme
members produced on contigious fields, and point to their very
successful project in the South African Venda bantustan which is
conducted in this manner. They also state that exploratory negotiations
had been held with the CDC on the possibility of introducing mixed
cropping on "communal blocks " under a leasing arrangement. Management
does face logistical problems when trying to assist and market the
product of farmers producing as far away as 70 kms from Casalee's base
in Nhlangano. Nevertheless, they do not favour an operation which would
site tobacco fields far away from homestead residences, as tobacco
requires intensive cultivation in order to produce a top grade crop.
As mentioned above, this intensive cultivation is ensured
through the "self exploitative" quality of petty commodity production
and it further emphasises the benefits for capital of outgrower schemes.
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The risks for agribusiness are diminished through control over the
circulation of agricultural commodities under contract arrangements, in
comparison to the risks involved in direct engagement in plantation
production. Here, even if great losses are sustained through crop
damage due to adverse weather, agricultural wages must still be paid.
Peasant production on outgrower schemes frees agribusiness from these
obligations, while at the same time facilitating the benefits of
absolute surplus value extraction from the "free exploitation" of women
and children which we have argued takes place in peasant production
units. These points are best illustrated through a brief examination of
Casalee's plantation operation.
CASALEE•s PLANTATION OPERATION
Casalee's plantation operation involves a fairly substantial
investment with capital assets estimated at E350 000. These were all
financed by Casalee itself. The company has two managers, one who
oversees the project as a whole and who manages the plantation's
enterprises, and another who concentrates on the peasant producers.
Casalee also brings in three assistant managers for roughly three months
of the year, to help plan and co-ordinate the marketing side of the
project with the other tobacco growing operations in the southern
African region. There is a single clerical worker, there are three
field officers concerned primarily with the petty commodity production
side of the operation, and four tractor drivers. Unskilled workers
selected, paid and directed by management in conjunction with two farm
foremen, are hired on a seasonal basis. Most of these are hired from
the surrounding community, and according to management, "labour is
readily available". Many of the labourers observed were children -
both boys and girls - and were paid at a rate of E3 per day, (management
did not specify the length of the working-day). No housing is supplied
for the workforce.
During its first two years of operation (1983/84 and 1984/85),
the company incurred substantial losses, but in 1985/86 Casalee's
fortunes began to change and it broke even. It turned out 170 tonnes of
tobacco as opposed to the 60 tonnes the previous season, and its target
for 1986/87 is 250 tonnes. Given the adverse weather conditions of low
rainfall levels during this season however, it is unlikely that this
target will be achieved.
A new manager was brought in at the end of the 1985/86 season,
and he believes that the early losses can be partially attributed to
managerial problems as well as to extensive damage to crops caused by
hail. He also cited soil acidity as a possible long term problem in the
operation of both the plantation enterprise and the peasant producer
scheme. In order for the project to achieve viability, an ideal yield
of 1 500 kg per hectare must be produced, and peasant producers must be
able to turn out the equivalent of at least one tonne per hectare.
Should production levels continue to rise, Casalee plans an
expansion of capital outlay in terms of plant space on its plantation
enterprise, new shed facilities for drying, and possibly a factory for
handling and packaging. This may materialise as conditions in Swaziland
are ideal because of the availability of sawdust which is crucial to the
curing process. At present, handling and packaging is conducted in
South Africa, and the product is exported through Durban to Belgium and
sold to the international Gallagher group.
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These arrangements contrast with those of the Tobacco
Co-operative whereby tobacco is sold to manufacturers in South Africa
with Swaziland's allocation being determined by the South African
Tobacco Board. When sufficient quantities are available, the South
African Board instructs the co-operative where tobacco should be
delivered, hence allocating quantities of each grade among South
African handlers. Only a small proportion of tobacco is sold locally.
The marketing side of Casalee's operation presents few problems
as Gallaghers want a supply of up to 1 000 tonnes. Hence, even if
output is trebled, there is greater demand than supply. The entire
final product is sold in Europe, and presently the Swaziland operation
constitutes around 10% of Gallaghers' market. With the quality of
Malawi's product falling, management believes that the potential of the
Swaziland project is limitless, but its ultimate success will depend
largely on the uptake of tobacco cultivation by peasant producers on
SNL.
2.3. Contract Farming and the Peasantry on SNL
The policy priority accorded to contract farming and outgrower
schemes raises a key question as to whether or not the creation of such
schemes can be achieved merely through policy decisions. This seems
unlikely, as they tend to depend on agribusiness which is often better
equipped to handle the marketing side, for the major investment. Even
if government is favourably disposed towards the establishment of
outgrower schemes, it cannot choose to introduce them on a large scale
without entering into a partnership with, or providing conditions
conducive towards agribusiness investment.
The Casalee operation has demonstrated that it is indeed
possible for contract arrangements to exist on SNL, but management
referred frequently to the success of the scheme in the Venda bantustan
in South Africa where production takes place on communal blocks of land.
This may be because stricter leasing arrangements facilitate greater
control by agribusiness over peasant production. Under prevailing
conditions it is not possible for Casalee to ensure that strict
agricultural production standards are adhered to. For instance, the
company cannot insist that peasant producers reside on their farms for
specified periods, and scheme membership can only be loosely defined in
terms of whether or not a petty commodity producer is engaged in tobacco
production during a particular season. Concern was also expressed by
management that petty commodity producers are scattered over such a
large area. This is a problem which any contract farming scheme on SNL
is bound to encounter and imposes serious logistical constraints on
management. Resettlement as presently practiced in Swaziland will not
overcome these problems. This is because the kind of rationalisation
involved in this process leaves homesteads dispersed widely over a large
area, albeit in some kind of straight line, and does not involve any
serious attempt at villagisation.
SNL holdings under traditional tenure place a barrier on
accumulation for successful peasant tobacco producers insofar as they
are unable to expand their production to a scale that would enable them
to obtain investable returns on their tobacco crop. Hence, even if the
decision to grow tobacco is "entrepreneurial", under SNL conditions it
is clear that for the majority of growers, prices received, less
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deductions for repayment of loans, provide little investable savings.
This situation is exacerbated from the growers' perspective in as much
as there is no open tobacco market leaving little opportunity for
entrepreneurial initiative.
Currie and Ray (1986) have encountered similar conditions in
Kenya and have thus argued that contract farming has consolidated the
growth of a class of agricultural producers whose household production
is sustained only at middle peasant level. Nevertheless, they have not
convincingly demonstrated that contract farming necessarily precludes
peasant accumulation, for while monopoly control over the market by
agribusiness may limit the marketing strategies and hence levels of
accumulation of peasants, it does not a fortiori rule out such
accumulation.
One implication is that in general, contract farming on SNL
benefits agribusiness more than the peasantry. For while the latter
clearly benefit from scheme membership, Casalee management gave a clear
impression that a major priority in seeking peasant producers is that
this arrangement would reduce company costs and transfer the
overwhelming burden of risk to the producers themselves. Furthermore,
the contract farming arrangement avoids the conflicts generated by
socialised production. Hence management argued that the Tibiyo
operation was beneficial because Tibiyo is less likely than Casalee to
be constrained by Swaziland's labour practices and regulations.
In Swaziland the Casalee project clearly shows that
agribusiness can integrate and utilise so-called traditional land tenure
practices to expand commodity production without destroying them. It is
these land tenure constraints as well as monopoly control over markets
by agribusiness which contribute to the predominant reproduction by
contract farming of a middle peasantry. For even when petty commodity
producers on SNL produce "efficiently", they may be unable to take
advantage of this to expand their productive units into economies of
scale and profitable ventures. In such cases, cash generated from
tobacco sales serves largely to maintain and reproduce household
consumption at middle peasant level. At the same time it should be
noted that there are cases of individual tobacco producers who through
inheritance have significant land holdings, and are in the process of
constructing more and larger tobacco sheds. This indicates significant
production levels and suggests that outgrower schemes of this sort do
not merely reproduce a "dependent middle peasantry" but do facilitate
the reproduction of a middle peasantry as well.
Outgrower Schemes on Title Deed Land
The foregoing analysis has revealed how outgrower schemes have
facilitated control by agribusiness over the conditions of peasant
production on SNL. It was also suggested that there is a greater
likelihood of achieving this control more effectively if leasehold title
to the land is acquired by the peasantry. Vuvulane Irrigated Farms
(VIF) provides such a case whereby petty commodity producers obtained
leasehold title through scheme participation. VIF was established in
1962 by the CDC and adjoins the Swaziland Irrigation Scheme (SIS) and
Mhlume Sugar estates which are both CDC operations. By 1973, 223 Swazi
peasants with average land holdings of 4,5 ha had joined the VIF scheme.
At the end of 1982, there were 263 plots on the scheme with an average
size of 3,2 - 6,5 ha. Sugar is the basic commodity produced and scheme
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members under the contract agreements are compelled to devote 70% pf
their land to this crop. On the remainder of their land they may grow
seasonal crops - mainly cotton and maize in summer and vegetables in
winter. According to the Fourth Plan, the annual mean net income for
scheme members over the 1978-82 period amounted to E3.500.
The scheme nevertheless has had a stormy past and according to
Fransman (1978) provided an important political base for Dr A. Zwane's
opposition Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) Party before the
outlawing of party politics in 1973. VIF also fell in the area where
the NNLC won three seats in the 1972 General Elections. Moreover, there
was much bitterness between smallholders and the CDC, who were viewed as
behaving like colonial landlords (Neocosmos and Testerink, 1985). Much
of this disaffection centred on the leasing arrangements, and this
eventually led the CDC to hand over "ownership" of the scheme to the
"Swazi Nation".
As has been argued elsewhere {Levin, 1987), although this type
of ownership refers to land held in trust by the monarch for the nation,
and thus in legal terms defines the land as SNL, it does in effect
amount to private ownership. In the early years, the question of
inheritance on the death of a settler and compensation on cancellation
of a tenancy were a source of friction and led the first CDC manager,
J.R. Tuckett, to recommend that specific legislation be enacted to deal
with this and other issues (Tuckett, 1975). Although no legislation was
passed, these issues were dealt with when new leases were implemented in
1975.
These twenty year freehold leases with rent re-negotiable after
the first ten years stated that the property should be used for
agricultural purposes only and that no animals should be kept without
permission. The leases also laid down strict agricultural standards
which tenants were required to adhere to and specified that the lease
may not be assigned without permission and that only the leaseholder and
his family and workers where applicable may reside there. Under this
leasing arrangement, tenants were obliged to spend ten months of the
year resident on the property, and the corporation was entitled to
cancel leases of tenants who did not pay the rent within thirty days or
who failed to comply with other conditions stipulated in the lease. In
the case of the death of a tenant, the corporation was given the right
to name a successor subject to compensation to the tenant's family, for
approved improvements to the property.
In 1982, legal title was handed over to the Swaziland National
Agricultural Development Corporation (SNADC), a parastatal, while the
land became SNL and was leased to the farmers on a twenty year renewable
basis. Management however remained in the hands of the CDC. Following
this transfer of "land ownership" to the "nation", peasants voiced
dissatisfaction over the fact that rents were still being charged
despite the fact that the land had been transferred to the Nation. The
transfer coincided with further slumps in an already depressed world
sugar market price. Growing dissatisfaction among producers led
government to institute a Commission of Enquiry to look into the
grievances of VIF farmers in 1985. The commission's sessions were held
in camera and although its work has been completed, the findings were
not made public.
Nevertheless, in 1986, the ownership of VIF passed from SNADC
to Tibiyo, but this failed to bring calm to the situation as fourteen
farmers in dispute with management over rent defaults were evicted from
the scheme. By early 1987 their appeals to the king for intervention
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had failed, and some of them were encamped with their families in
temporary shelters on the edge of the scheme awaiting a sympathetic ear
in Lobamba.
From available evidence, it appears that net income has been
slight for the majority of scheme members since the slump in the world
sugar market. Sugar production on 70% of allocated land is sufficient
to cover overheads alone, and it is only on the remaining 30% of the
land that realisaton of any profit occurs.
This does not generate substantial income for the majority of
members who are only able to reproduce themselves as a middle peasantry.
Nevertheless differentiation is taking place, because a few scheme
members have over the years been able to purchase tractors. These
tractor owners profit both from their sugar cane (due to savings on
ploughing and hauling) as well as vegetable holdings, indicating that
outgrower schemes of the Vuvulane type provide the conditions for the
reproduction of a rich as well as a middle peasantry, for tractor
ownership in itself is sufficient "proof" of the existence of a rich
peasantry. This also shows how outgrower schemes differentiate peasant
participants in addition to generating differentiation between the
latter and other sections of the peasantry.
The Mpetsheni Pineapple Scheme
Another outgrower scheme based on peasant leaseholdings is
situated in the Malkerns Valley adjoining Swazican. The Mpetsheni
Pineapple Settlement Scheme was established after the Swaziland
Settlement Company (SSC - formerly known as the Mushroom Settlement
Company), bought 250 ha of land from Usuthu Pulp Company in Malkerns.
The colonial Government was approached for ideas on how to develop the
land, and decided to lease it from SSC and develop a settlement scheme
for Swazi smallholders. The government formed a subsidiary company
called the Pineapple Setlement Company (PSC) to operate the scheme, and
a lease agreement was then drawn up between government, the SSC and the
PSC to cover an initial period of twelve years. The scheme was formally
established in 1964 and became operational at the end of 1965.
According to Magagula (1980), the main objective of the scheme
was to promote equality in the rural areas between Swazi peasants and
European settler farmers by expanding "commercial opportunities" for
rural Swazis and involving them in cash crop production. He also states
that the scheme was seen as an indirect device by the colonial
authorities for subverting the traditional socio-economic
characteristics of rural Swazi society. The aim was for scheme members
to become so financially viable that they would be able to purchase
their plots and become landowners after twelve years.
The 250 ha of land allocated for the scheme was originally
subdivided into twenty-seven farms of just over 9 ha each. The scheme
was financed by a government-backed loan from the Swaziland Development
Savings Bank and the SSC. The initial funds were used to provide
administrative personnel and a central equipment pool to be run on a
hire basis. Loans were also made available to scheme members for the
development of their holdings and for providing them with basic services
such as housing and water. Each member was required to repay these
loans as well as loans provided for leasehold rights.
The lease agreement provided for loan finance and rules of
behaviour and farming performance for the smallholders. The company was
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appointed marketing agent, and settlers were obliged to follow the
company's marketing arrangements. A significant aspect of this clause
of the lease was that farmers were prohibited from selling pineapples to
the fresh vegetable market. This enabled the various companies which
have operated the nearby pineapple cannery in Malkerns to ensure
monopoly control over the marketing of outgrowers' produce both to
secure a steady supply of fresh fruit to the cannery and to ensure that
all proceeds from pineapple sales are accounted for and credited to the
settlers' loan accounts.
There are currently nineteen members remaining in the scheme,
and it is clear that management was highly selective in granting
membership, and also that there is little likelihood of the scheme being
expanded so that more members can be incorporated. Members come from
all over Swaziland and were selected by the PSC whose chief priority was
the suitability of candidates for small scale commodity producing
operations. Membership was obtained by individuals and, as noted, the
initial premise was that members would be sufficiently viable
financially within about twelve years to have repaid their various loans
and to thus be in a position to purchase their plots and become freehold
title deed land owners. This meant that the intention was that
inheritance of membership would be determined by Roman-Dutch Law, unless
a member was married by Swazi customary law only, in which case
ownership of the plot would devolve according to Swazi law and custom.
Scheme members engage in pineapple production with family
labour which "assists" with ploughing, planting and weeding, and in
cases casual labour is hired for weeding and harvesting in particular,
at an average rate of E3 per day, excluding means and lodging. This in
itself is indicative of the kind of differentiating effect of this
outgrower scheme, for the fact that wage-labour (however casual) is in
cases being employed on the scheme, demonstrates that accumulation is
indeed taking place and conditions for the reproduction of a rich
peasantry are present.
Harvesting is done collectively with all scheme members, their
families and hired labour where applicable. Ploughs, tractors and other
capital equipment is available on loan from the company, while
fertiliser and herbicides are purchased directly from the canning
company.
The indebtedness of members plagued the progress of the scheme
in its early years, and despite the scheme's objective of having members
repay their loans and qualify to purchase their land within twelve
years, in the sixth year of the scheme the average indebtedness was over
E7 000. In 1973 the scheme's settlement officer estimated that about
three-quarters of the members would only be able to repay their loans
over twenty-six years. As indebtedness increased, some settlers who
stood little chance of repaying their various loans were forced to
relinquish membership of the scheme. Government was requested to
intervene in order to rescue the scheme and eventually in 1973 agreed to
inject E61 000 in order to settle the acounts of members who had been
evicted or dropped out of the scheme. Nevertheless, indebtedness
persisted, and between 1975 and 1978 actually increased by about E10 000
with accumulated losses standing at E26 736 (Magagula, op cit.:9).
By this time, nineteen producers remained on the scheme of whom
twelve had paid off their debts and therefore fulfilled the requirements
to be issued with title deed to the land. The fact that eight members
had dropped out within ten years of the scheme's inception, and that by
that time twelve of the nineteen remaining members had paid off their
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debts, indicates that a complex process of differentiation was taking
place on the scheme.
But the scheme has faced a problem of state reluctance to
approve the purchase of the plots by members who have paid outstanding
loans. According to the last government field officer assigned to the
scheme, this reluctance has in theory been overcome, but in practice,
members who have now all paid their initial loans are still awaiting the
legal titles to the land. Some of them have been promised additional
land allocations of up to 4,5 ha.
Management of the scheme was originally entrusted to the PSC,
with Government, the SSC and the King represented in the Board of
Directors. Scheme members were not represented on the board and gained
access to it through the project manager. Requests by the peasantry for
representation on the board were turned down because, according to the
PSC, adequate channels existed for communication between scheme members
and board. Meetings between the chairman of the board, the project
manager and the peasantry were infrequent and complaints by the latter
over this issue were answered by the PSC which asserted that settlers
made use of such meetings to raise "frivolous" issues and that if
"things ere not running smoothly" the board was "satisfied that this is
due to the uncooperative attitude of a number of settlers", (Ibid.).
By 1981, although scheme members had met all obligations for
land purchase, government withdrew from the scheme, thereby effectively
liquidating the PSC and leaving management of the project in the
members' own hands. Management has since been taken over by a farmers'
association which has its own elected committee chosen every two years.
This organisation is financed by joining fees and subscription shares
and meets once a week.
Figures quoted by Magagula show that per hectare production
declined between 1968 and 1975 from 54 to 17 tonnes. Nevertheless, cash
receipts increased due to rising prices and improved quality produce,
from E12 900 to E85 461 during this period. Current production has been
put at about 50 tonnes per ha. Only pineapples are produced on
allocated plots as the herbicide used has rendered the soil unsuitable
for cultivation of other crops.
All marketing of the crop is handled by Swazican, the current
owners of the cannery who took over the company from Libby's in 1984.
Changes in ownership of the cannery have caused marketing problems, but
at present these do not exist. In 1968, for instance, Swaziland Canners
Ltd went into liquidation during the harvesting season and government
and local businessmen were forced to stage a rescue operation. Peasant
producers were not paid for a substantial amount of fruit which they had
delivered to the cannery, causing them severe financial hardship. As
noted, members are compelled to market their pineapples through the
company and are only permited to sell substandard pineapples on the
vegetable market.
Magagula argues that this scheme was not adequately planned. No
detailed soil survey was undertaken and it was subsequently discovered
that a number of plots were prone to waterlogging due to shallow soils
and were therefore unsuitable for pineapple cultivation. Another
problem with the scheme was that at its inception, neither the company
nor the petty commodity producers had working capital. With high
interest loans, the debt situation of the peasant producers was
aggravated. Although this indebtedness was ultimately largely overcome
through state intervention, the scheme has no cash flow as there is
no-one willing to finance the operation until members obtain their legal
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titles to the land- Finance is needed to replace out of date technology
and equipment such as tractors which are now old and worn out.
It is clear that the actual management of the scheme has been
one of its major problems since inception. The lack of participation by
peasants in the first decade and a half of the scheme's operation
created hostility between management and scheme members as in the
Vuvulane case. The board seemed to take the view that the peasants'
failure owed to their laziness and indiscipline. The last government
officer assigned to the scheme cited the fact that management has not
existed since 1981 as a major reason for lack of profit realisation on
the scheme. Hoever, it is difficult to envisage how the scheme can be
profitable under self-management until members receive their legal title
to the land and are hence enabled to secure bank loans to inject capital
into the scheme. Presently credit is issued by Swazican, but only for
purchase of inputs, with these amounts deducted after delivery of the
crop.
The Mpetsheni Pineapple Scheme is an interesting case of an
outgrower scheme which has, over time, transformed itself into a type of
producer-co-operative on title deed land. However, it is unlikely that
projects of this sort will become a central element of government rural
development strategy. The former government officer on the scheme
stated quite unequivocally that experience had taught him that it was
not government policy to develop more schemes of this nature which would
open up freehold land to agricultural petty commodity producers. This
view is attested by the drawn out procedure which seems to be taking
place in order to grant the actual legal titles to scheme members. This
has been a very traumatic experience for those who have persisted with
the scheme, and who have ultimately been compelled to take over the
management of the entire project. They experimented with hiring a
manager, but this arrangement proved to be unsuccessful as substantial
amounts of money went unaccounted.
Under present arrangements, members on average are realising
between £3 000 and E4 000 each year, indicating that as in the case of
Casalee and Vuvulane conditions have been created for the reproduction
of a predominant middle peasantry reproducing themselves through
agricultural petty commodity production without being compelled to take
up wage employment. As at Vuvulane and with Casalee, the production of
a rich peasantry has been facilitated, and wage labour is being hired by
peasants on the Mpetsheni scheme. State reluctance to issue peasant
members with their freehold titles is acting as a break on accumulation,
and these constraints are exacerbated since, as in most contract farming
schemes, it is peasants who bear the major investment risks while the
more lucrative marketing side of the operation is monopolised and
controlled by agribusiness.
Through years of practical experience, scheme members have
obtained the necessary skills to enable them to cultivate pineapples
efficiently, and indeed, to manage the scheme as a whole on their own.
But given existing government reluctance to make private property
available to substantial numbers of peasant producers, it is unlikely
that this type of scheme will be established elsewhere in Swaziland in
the near future.
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CONCLUSION
The development of capitalism in Swaziland has produced
undemocratic political forms including an undemocratic management of
land allocation and control. While sections of the royal family and
their confidantes benefit from their control of this system which
facilitates monopoly over agriculture as a whole, it is unlikely that
private freehold land ownership will be opened up to the mass of petty
commodity producers on SNL. This may affect the form that contract
farming schemes will take in Swaziland, but it does not imply that such
production remains a residue of pre-capitalism. This study has shown
how agricultural capital in Swaziland can benefit from outgrower schemes
both on SNL and Title Deed Land. This is because land tenure ultimately
concerns phenomenal legal forms and processes which cannot be understood
outside the context of essential capitalist relations - the wage labour
- capital relation - which characterise the development of agriculture
in Swaziland. But while agricultural capital has benefitted from the
"self-exploitation" of peasants, in cases the latter have also
benefitted, for, as has been stressed throughout this paper, outgrower
schemes have had differential effects on the peasantry, providing the
conditions for the reproduction of both a middle and rich peasantry.
The domination of outgrowers by agribusiness may suggest that
producers in such schemes are no more than "wage-labour equivalents"
(Bernstein, 1982) in a relationship of dependence on the managers of the
enterprise who control the scheme. While this to a certain extent
describes some of the processes taking place, it appears to be misplaced
to conflate agricultural wages with petty commodity production
activities. This is why it is more useful to understand contract
farming as a specific form of agricultural production which has
differentiating effects and generates new relationships between the
majority of contract farmers as a middle peasantry, an incipient rich
peasantry and agricultural capital. Rather than producing a homogeneous
class of "wage labour equivalents" or a "dependent middle peasantry",
outgrower schemes generate petty commodity production which itself is
differentiating (Gibbon and Neocosmos, 1985).
It is apparent from available evidence that the development of
contract farming and outgrower schemes in Swaziland has had differential
effects. On the one hand, outgrower schemes on SNL, while providing the
conditions for the production and reproduction of a differentiated
peasantry, inhibit accumulation through the limited access to land which
peasants have. Thus, although rich peasants can reproduce themselves
through such schemes on SNL, and present indication are that they will
in fact do so, it would appear in the case of Casalee that it is
predominantly a middle peasantry that is being reproduced. Although
this to a certain extent supports the findings of Currie and Ray (1986)
and Cowen (1981), there is no evidence that outgrower schemes preclude
the reproduction of a rich peasantry. This is clearly seen in the
Vuvulane and Mpetsheni cases where conditions conducive to accumulation
have been provided by the scheme, even if the majority of scheme members
reproduce themselves as middle peasants. At Mpetsheni there is strong
evidence of peasant differentiation emphasised by dropout patterns, the
varied capacity of different peasants to repay their loans, along with
the fact that wage labour (however casaul) is being hired. At VIF,
tractor owners are accumulating both from their sugar plots and their
vegetable holdings, but on both schemes a ceiling over the level of
accumulation by a rich peasantry is provided by the monopoly power which
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agricultural capital exercises over the marketing of the scheme's
principal crop. Accumulation through production schemes can also be
seen in government cattle ranches where scheme participants have
accumulated sufficient capital to purchase their own freehold farms and
hence become capitalist farmers. While this is not possible for rich
peasants who participate in contract farming, this does not mean that
peasants cannot accumulate through engagement in such schemes. The
evidence presented on the process of differentiation taking place
through contract farming and outgrower schemes suggests that an urgent
task of future research in this area lies in the collection of more
empirical data that will give flesh to these evident trends.
4 ,
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NOTES
1. The most thorough analysis and description of traditional land
tenure has been provided by Hughes (1972).
2. For a detailed discussion of these events and the actual land
partition see, inter alia, P. Bonner (1983), J. Crush (1980),
F. Mashasha (1977) and M. Fransman (1978).
3. Interview with Mr H. Bezuidenhout, manager of Casalee (until
July 1986), 21 March 1986.
4. Interview with Mr T. O'Neill-Williams, manager of Casalee, 14
October 1986.
5. Interview with Mr T. O'Neill-Williams, 4 November 1986.
6. This is according to an extension officer hired the VIF (13
August 1986).
7. Interview with Mr D. Gama, former government field officer to
the Mpetsheni Settlement Scheme, 10 June 1986.
8. Ibid.
9. Contrary to the "articulationist" position of Wolpe (1972),
evidence presented here demonstrates that in the case of
Swaziland, specific forms of capitalist development in
agriculture (petty commodity production) are taking place on
SNL.
10. For more detailed discussions of the question of essential
relations and phenomenal forms, see Sayer (1979), Neocosmos
(1982) and Neocosmos and Gibbon (1985).
11. This is true of "sisa" ranches where SNL cattle producers can
crossbreed their stock. Interview with Messrs B. Biya and M.
Mkhabula, assistant manager and farm foreman, Nyanyou Sisa
Ranch, 26 May 1986.
# * # # * #
Contract Farming 17.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
H. Bernstein (1982) "Notes on Capital and the Peasantry" in
J. Haines (ed.) (1982) Rural Development, (London).
H. Bernstein (1985) "Agrarian Crisis and Neo-Classical
Populism", University of London, ICS Seminar on Peasants, 15
March.
M. Buch-Hansen and H.S. Marcusen (1982) "Contract Farming and
the Peasantry: Cases from Western Kenya", Review of African
Political Economy, 23.
M. Cowen (1981) "Community Production in Kenya's Central
Province", in J. Heyer, P. Roberts and G. Williams (eds.) Rural
Development in Tropical Africa, (London).
J. Crush (1980) "The Colonial Division of Space: The
Significance of the Swaziland Land Partition", The
International Journal of African Historical Studies, 13.
K. Currie and L. Ray (1986) "On the Class Location of
Contract Farmers in the Kenyan Economy", Economy and Society,
15, 4.
B. Dinham and C. Hines (1983) Agribusiness in Africa,
(London).
A. Dlamini (1985) "Tobacco Growing in the Shiselweni
District: A case study of the Mahamba-Zambodze Rural
Development Area", BA Dissertation, University of Swaziland,
(Kwaluseni).
M. Fransman (1978) "The State and Development in Swaziland",
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Sussex.
P. Gibbon and M. Neocosmos (1985) "Some Problems in the
Political Economy of African Socialism" in H. Bernstein and B.
Campbell, Contradictions of Accumulation in Africa, (Beverley
Hills).
D. Glover (1984) "Contract Farming and Smallholder Outgrower
Schemes in Less-developed Countries", World Development, 12,
11/12.
A. Goldsmith (1985) "The Private Sector and Rural
Development: Can Agribusiness Help the Small Farmer?" in H.
Bernstein and B. Campbell, Contradictions of Accumulation in
Africa, {Beverley Hills).
A.J.B. Hughes (1972) Land Tenure, Land Rights and Land
Communities on Swazi Nation Land in Swaziland, University of
Natal (Durban).
f Contract Farming 18.
R. Levin (1987) "Traditional Land Tenure in Swaziland:
Technical Efficiency, Problems of Democratic Organisation and
the Value of Legalistic Classifications", (mimeo).
G.T. Magagula (1980) "Rural Development Through Settlement
Programmes: The Organisational, Structural and Environmental
Problems of the Mphetsheni Settlement Scheme in Swaziland",
(mimeo).
F.J. Mashasha (1977) "The Road to Colonialism: Concessions
and the Collapse of Swazi Independence, 1875-1926", Ph.D.
Thesis, University of Oxford.
M. Neocosmos (1982) Agrarian Reform and the Development of
Capitalism in Agriculture, Ph.D. Thesis, University of
Bradford.
M. Neocosmos and J. Testerink (1985) "Contract Farming in
Swaziland: A Research Proposal", IDRC Workshop on Contract
Farming and Smallholder Outgrower Schemes, (Nairobi).
D. Sayer (1979) Marx's Method, (London).
C. Scott (1977) "Review of K. Griffen: The Political Economy
of Agrarian Change", Journal of Peasant Studies, 4, 2, January.
Swaziland Government (1985) Fourth National Development Plan,
(Mbabane).
J.R. Tuckett (1975) Vuvulane Irrigated Farms: A Report on
the First Ten years, (Mananga).
